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I 
INTRODUCTION 
What does the law mean to the common person? Such a broad question 
could be answered in more than one way, depending on one’s vantage point, 
disciplinary background, and so forth. From an economic-analysis perspective, 
an individual actor would consider the law as a system of incentives. In this 
view, incentives provide—indeed, constitute—reasons for action. The focus thus 
shifts from incentives in isolation to the mechanism that engenders such 
incentive-sensitive behavior. In the traditional neoclassical economic account, 
individuals respond to incentives with a motivation to maximize their expected 
utility—also known as rational preferences. Economic analysis of law that 
subscribes to the rationality assumption thus treats the law as a price system of 
sorts. 
That the traditional rationality assumption fails systematically in predicting 
people’s behavior in important circumstances is not much in dispute anymore. 
Research on bounded rationality in behavioral economics harnesses insights 
primarily from cognitive psychology to suggest directions for developing an 
organizing framework for non-standard preference formation. This research 
addresses major aspects in which actual behavior diverges from the behavior 
predicted by the traditional rationality-based model. However, because 
economics still lacks a general theoretical account that could replace the 
rational preference workhorse, legal applications of behavioral economics tend 
to be more specific than general, at least at the level of generality reflected in 
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the question that opens this article: What does the law mean to the common 
person? 
This article makes an admittedly bold attempt at outlining an analytical 
framework for addressing this question. Instead of looking at the legal 
implications of bounded rationality—an exercise highly worthy in its own 
right—this article advances a theory of expanded rationality. This theory retains 
the element of rationality in that people respond to incentives in an attempt to 
attain utility, and it does not question the observation that decision-making is 
often bounded due to various factors. The main thrust of the present theory is 
to expand the concept of personal utility such that it comprises personal values. 
This theory might be useful for economics in general, but it could be 
particularly beneficial for elaborating law-and-economics accounts of legal 
issues that have been restricted by the traditional model of rationality. 
Defined as conceptions of the desirable, values guide the way individuals 
select actions, evaluate people and events, and explain or justify their actions 
and evaluations. Values thus operate as arguments in individuals’ personal 
utility functions, underlie the construction of preferences, and provide reasons 
for reason-based choice. The present theory expands the conception of 
rationality by incorporating a set of motivational goals that is richer than the 
standard depiction of self-interestedness, yet avoids tautology. This expanded, 
values-based account of preferences and incentives lends itself to illuminating 
fundamental questions about legal design and the role of law in society. 
The remainder of this article describes the theoretical underpinnings of the 
expanded rationality model and its application to the law. Part II provides a 
brief introduction to the theory of values as it has developed in psychology. Part 
III reviews two central strands in the economic literature on rationality and 
demonstrates how the theory of values can serve to develop a general account 
of expanded rationality. Part IV applies this theory to four fundamental legal 
problems: (1) the link between values and the content of laws, (2) the role of 
values in law abidingness, (3) the effect of value diversity in groups on legal 
design, and (4) the crucial aspect of value conflict in the application of law. 
II 
VALUES: CONCEPTUALIZING THE DESIRABLE 
A. The Nature of Values 
For several decades, research in social psychology has developed and 
refined theories on individual values. Although economists and law-and-
economics scholars cannot be accused of ignoring psychology, this branch of 
psychological research has been virtually overlooked despite its considerable 
potential; thus, this part presents with some detail the currently dominant 
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theory.1 According to Shalom Schwartz, a consensus has emerged among social 
scientists about how to conceptualize basic values. This conception includes six 
features: 
1.  Values are beliefs that are linked inextricably to affect. When values are activated, 
they become infused with feeling. People for whom independence is an important 
value become aroused if their independence is threatened, despair when they are 
helpless to protect it, and are happy when they can enjoy it. 
2.  Values refer to desirable goals that motivate action. People for whom social order, 
justice, and helpfulness are important values are motivated to promote these goals. 
3.  Values transcend specific actions and situations. Obedience and honesty, for 
example, are values that may be relevant at work or in school, in sports, business, and 
politics, with family, friends, or strangers. This feature distinguishes values from 
narrower concepts like norms and attitudes that usually refer to specific actions, 
objects, or situations. 
4.  Values serve as standards or criteria. Values guide the selection or evaluation of 
actions, policies, people, and events. People decide what is good or bad, justified or 
illegitimate, worth doing or avoiding, by considering the effects on attaining their 
cherished values. 
5.  Values are ordered by importance relative to one another. The ordered set of 
values forms a system of value priorities. Societies and individuals can be 
characterized by their systems of value priorities. Do people attribute more 
importance to achievement or justice, to novelty or to tradition? This hierarchical 
feature also distinguishes values from norms and attitudes. 
6.  The relative importance of multiple values guides action. Any attitude or behavior 
typically has implications for more than one value. For example, attending church 
might express and promote tradition, conformity, and security values for a person at 
the expense of hedonism and stimulation values. The trade-off among relevant, 
competing values is what guides attitudes and behaviors. Values contribute to action 
to the extent that they are relevant in the context (hence likely to be activated) and 
important to the actor.2 
Schwartz has advanced a comprehensive theory of individual-level values 
that represent universal requirements of human existence—namely, biological 
needs, coordination of social interaction, and group functioning—as 
motivational goals.3 Since its introduction, this has been the predominant theory 
of individual values in psychology.4 Table 1 provides definitions of the ten 
values distinguished by the theory and value items that reflect them. 
 
 1. The following draws liberally on Shalom H. Schwartz, Value Orientations: Measurement, 
Antecedents and Consequences Across Nations, in MEASURING ATTITUDES CROSS-NATIONALLY:  
LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY 169 (Roger Jowell et al. eds., 2007). 
 2. Id. at 170–71 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 3. See Shalom H. Schwartz, Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances 
and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (Mark 
Zanna ed., 1992); Shalom H. Schwartz, Are There Universal Aspects in the Content and Structure of 
Values?, J. SOC. ISSUES, Winter 1994, at 19. 
 4. See PETER B. SMITH, MICHAEL HARRIS BOND & CIGDEM KAGITCIBASI, UNDERSTANDING 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ACROSS CULTURES ch. 2 (3d ed. 2006); Steven Hitlin & Jane A. Piliavin, 
Values: Reviving a Dormant Concept, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 359 (2004). For earlier theories, see Clyde 
Kluckhohn, Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action, in TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF 
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Table 1: The Schwartz Individual Value Types and Values that Represent 
Them 
Self-Direction Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring (creativity, 
freedom, independent, curious, choosing own goals) 
Stimulation Excitement, novelty and challenge in life (daring, a varied life, an exciting life) 
Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself (pleasure, enjoying life) 
Achievement Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social 
standards (successful, capable, ambitious, influential) 
Power Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources (social 
power, authority, wealth) 
Security Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships and of self (family 
security, national security, social order, clean, reciprocation of favors) 
Conformity Restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses likely to upset or harm others and 
violate social expectations or norms (self-discipline, obedient, politeness, 
honoring parents and elders) 
Tradition Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional 
culture or religion provide (accepting my portion in life, humble, devout, respect 
for tradition, moderate) 
Benevolence Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in 
frequent personal contact (helpful, honest, forgiving, loyal, responsible) 
Universalism Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all 
people and for nature (broadminded, wisdom, social justice, equality, a world at 
peace, a world of beauty, unity with nature, protecting the environment) 
 
Schwartz’s theory further specifies the structural interrelations among 
values. These values can be drawn as segments of a circle. Figure 1 depicts this 
spatial arrangement. Adjacent values are conceptually close to one another, 
whereas opposing values express conceptually diametrical goals in life. Thus, 
individuals who put a high emphasis on values of universalism (social justice, 
equality) would also tend to emphasize benevolence values (helpful, honest, et 
cetera). People who emphasize universalism and benevolence would tend to de-











ACTION 388 (Talcott Parsons & Edward A. Shils eds., 1951); MILTON ROKEACH, THE NATURE OF 
HUMAN VALUES (1973). 
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 The relationships between the ten values can be summarized in two basic 
conflicts: self-enhancement versus self-transcendence and openness-to-change 
versus conservation. Self-enhancement values focus on self-interest through the 
pursuit of control over people and resources (power), and of competence and 
success (achievement). These values conflict with self-transcendence values that 
reflect concern for close others (benevolence) and for all people and nature 
(universalism). Openness-to-change values reflect openness to what is new: 
excitement and novelty (stimulation), and autonomy of thought and action 
(self-direction). These values conflict with conservation values,  which reflect a 
strong preference to preserve the status quo through a commitment to past 
beliefs and customs (tradition), adherence to social norms and expectations 
(conformity), and stability for self and close others (security). Hedonism values 
share elements of both openness-to-change and self-enhancement. 
An alternative, more recent two-dimensional structure classifies values into 
ones that regulate the expression of personal characteristics and interests 
(person-focused: self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, and 
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power) versus those that regulate relations with others and effects on them 
(social-focused: universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security).5 
Simultaneously, this classification groups values into those that express anxiety-
free self-expansion (growth values: self-direction, universalism, benevolence, 
stimulation, and hedonism) versus those that express anxiety-based self-
protection (protection values: security, power, achievement, conformity, and 
tradition). 
The ten basic values are intended to include all the core values recognized in 
cultures around the world. Analyses of numerous samples from scores of 
countries in every inhabited continent supported the discrimination of the ten 
basic values and the two-dimensional structure, indicating that the model 
provides an excellent representation of the average individual value structure 
across literate cultures.6 
B. Values, Behavior, and Other Factors 
A growing number of studies link value priorities to behavior and social 
roles. Several factors may be involved in mediating or moderating the causal 
link from values to action.7 Yet, overall, as research on values progresses, it 
becomes evident that people tend to make decisions and behave consistently 
with their values. Although most of the evidence in this regard is correlational, 
recent important studies show that activating values causes behavior.8 
The types of behavior that exhibit relations with individuals’ value priorities 
range from the very mundane to principled choices to life-changing decisions. 
Similarly, conceptual consistency between value priorities and behavior has 
been observed in experimental settings, among lay and professional samples, 
and in national representative samples. In particular, value priorities correlate 
with people’s daily behaviors.9 Values systematically associate with voting for 
 
 5. Shalom H. Schwartz, Basic Values: How They Motivate and Inhibit Prosocial Behavior, in 
PROSOCIAL MOTIVES, EMOTIONS, AND BEHAVIOR 221, 226–28 (Mario Mikulincer & Phillip R. Shaver 
eds., 2009). 
 6. See Shalom H. Schwartz & Klaus Boehnke, Evaluating the Structure of Human Values with 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis, 38 J. RES. PERSONALITY 230, 232 (2004) (outlining a previous analysis 
of over 200 samples from over sixty countries that identified the ten values in countries across the 
world). For earlier stages of this project, see sources cited supra note 3. 
 7. A vast literature on judgment and decision-making analyzes the role of factors of this sort, 
including boundaries on cognitive processes that may engender bounded rationality. For good 
introductory sources, see HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES 
THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008); Robyn M. Dawes, Behavioral Decision Making and Judgment, in 
1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 497 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). 
 8. Bas Verplanken & Rob W. Holland, Motivated Decision-Making: Effects of Activation and 
Self-Centrality of Values on Choices and Behavior, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 434 (2002); 
Lilach Sagiv, Noga Sverdlik & Norbert Schwarz, To Compete or to Cooperate? Values’ Impact on 
Perception and Action in Social Dilemma Games, 41 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 64 (2011). 
 9. Anat Bardi & Shalom H. Schwartz, Values and Behavior: Strength and Structure of Relations, 
29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1207 (2003). 
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political parties whose agendas reflect voters’ values.10 The values that people 
hold dear are compatible with their vocational interests and with their choices 
between entrepreneurial self-employment versus salaried jobs.11 Board 
members in public corporations exhibit a preference for strategic business 
decisions that are consistent with their values.12 Finally, several studies link 
value priorities with consumption choices and behaviors that are more 
environmentally sensitive.13 Anecdotally, even buying an iPad associates with a 
certain value profile.14 
Finally, it deserves emphasizing that values also relate systematically to a set 
of fundamental psychological factors mentioned here only in passing. Values 
thus have been conceptualized as the core of personal identity.15 Value priorities 
are associated with personality traits according to the “Big Five” model.16 Value 
priorities correlate systematically with the need for cognitive closure.17 Finally, 
value priorities correlate (modestly) with individual social axiom beliefs.18 
 
 10. See Shalom H. Schwartz, Value Priorities and Behavior: Applying a Theory of Integrated Value 
Systems, in 8 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VALUES: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 1, 10 (Clive Seligman, James 
M. Olson & Mark P. Zanna eds., 1996); Marina F. Barnea & Shalom H. Schwartz, Values and Voting, 
19 POL. PSYCHOL. 17 (1998); Gian Vittorio Caprara et al., Personality and Politics: Values, Traits, and 
Political Choice, 27 POL. PSYCHOL. 1 (2006). 
 11. See Florian Noseleit, The Entrepreneurial Culture: Guiding Principles of the Self-Employed, in 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND CULTURE 41 (Andreas Freytag & Roy Thurik eds., 2010); Lilach Sagiv, 
Vocational Interests and Basic Values, 10 J. CAREER ASSESSMENT 233 (2002). On the link between 
value acquisition in the family and career choices, see Steven Hitlin, Parental Influences on Children’s 
Values and Aspirations: Bridging Two Theories of Social Class and Socialization, 49 SOC. PERSP. 25 
(2006). 
 12. Renée B. Adams, Amir N. Licht & Lilach Sagiv, Shareholders and Stakeholders: How Do 
Directors Decide?, STRATEGIC MGMT. J. (forthcoming 2011). 
 13. See generally Suzanne C. Grunert & Hans Jorn Juhl, Values, Environmental Attitudes, and 
Buying of Organic Foods, 16 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 39 (1995); Annika M. Nordlund & Jorgen Garvill, 
Values Structures Behind Proenvironmental Behavior, 34 ENV’T & BEHAV. 740 (2002); John Thøgersen 
& Folke Ölander, Human Values and the Emergence of a Sustainable Consumption Pattern: A Panel 
Study, 23 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 605 (2002). See also Judith I.M. de Groot & Linda Steg, Value 
Orientations to Explain Beliefs Related to Environmental Significant Behavior: How to Measure 
Egoistic, Altruistic, and Biospheric Value Orientations, 40 ENV’T & BEHAV. 330 (2008).  
 14. MYTYPE, THE PERSONALITY, VALUES AND DEMOGRAPHICS BEHIND CONSUMER OPINIONS 
OF THE IPAD (2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/34438276/iPad-Opinion-Profile-by-
MyType-July-2010. 
 15. Steven Hitlin, Values as the Core of Personal Identity: Drawing Links Between Two Theories of 
Self, 66 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 118 (2003). 
 16. Sonia Roccas et al., The Big Five Personality Factors and Personal Values, 28 PERSP. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 789 (2002). On the Big Five model, see generally ROBERT R. MCCRAE & PAUL T. 
COSTA, JR., PERSONALITY IN ADULTHOOD: A FIVE-FACTOR THEORY PERSPECTIVE (2d ed. 2003). 
 17. Renee B. Adams, Amir N. Licht & Lilach Sagiv, Shareholderism: Board Members’ Values and 
the Shareholder-Stakeholder Dilemma  (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 
204/2008, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1118664 (explaining that, specifically, conservation 
values correlate positively with need for closure, and openness-to-change values correlate negatively 
with it). 
 18. Kwok Leung et al., Social Axioms and Values: A Cross-Cultural Examination, 21 EUR. J. 
PERSONALITY 91 (2007). 
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III 
EXPANDED RATIONALITY: RECONCEPTUALIZING THE PREFERRED 
During the past several years, the field of economics has reached a new 
stage in the study of the boundaries of rationality. The field has grown in scope 
such that “bounded rationality” and “behavioral economics” denote closely 
related, but often independent, lines of work.19 In addition to documenting ever 
more behavioral deviations from the predictions of the standard model and 
suggesting models that might account for these deviations, writers growingly 
call for theorizing at a higher level of generality. “For the field to advance 
further,” argues one leading economist, “it should devote more attention to the 
foundations of its models, and develop unified explanations for a wider range of 
phenomena.”20 
Efforts toward more general theorizing have proceeded on several fronts. 
This part of the article presents two developments: (1) classifying the numerous 
behavioral deviations from the standard model into broad categories of non-
standard preferences and (2) identifying processes that may systematically give 
rise to variance of preferences. 
A. Non-Standard Preferences 
“Non-standard preferences” has become the standard term for the slew of 
well-documented departures from the preference profile underlying the 
standard model.21 Within this broad category, three to four objects of non-
standard preferences stand out: time, risk, ambiguity, and others. Not all 
commentators refer to the full set, however, as preference (or aversion) toward 
ambiguity is the least-discussed type.22 This section reviews advances in the 
 
 19. Glenn Ellison, Bounded Rationality in Industrial Organization, in 2 ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS 
AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, NINTH WORLD CONGRESS 142, 142 (Richard 
Blundell, Whitney K. Newey & Torsten Persson eds., 2006); Drew Fudenberg, Advancing Beyond 
“Advances in Behavioral Economics,” 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 694 (2006). 
 20. Fudenberg, supra note 19, at 694. See also Colin E. Camerer, Behavioral Economics, in 2 
ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, NINTH WORLD 
CONGRESS 181, 191 (Richard Blundell, Whitney K. Newey & Torsten Persson, eds., 2006); Colin F. 
Camerer & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future, in ADVANCES IN 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 3, 14 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004); Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 
Behavioral Economics Comes of Age: A Review Essay on Advances in Behavioral Economics, 44 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 712, 720 (2006). 
 21. See Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 315 (2009). 
 22. See id.; Sendhil Mullainathan & Richard H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics, in 2 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 1094 (2001) (focusing on 
time, risk, and other-regarding preferences); George F. Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Animal 
Spirits: Affective and Deliberative Processes in Economic Behavior (May 2005), available at 
http://www.arts.cornell.edu/econ/edo1/will.pdf (discussing time, risk, and other-regarding preferences); 
Camerer, supra note 20 (focusing on the time, risk, ambiguity, and self-interest preferences). 
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study of other-regarding preferences and of ambiguity preferences, as they are 
most pertinent to the theory of values. 
1. Other-Regarding Preferences 
Though a good deal has been written in the behavioral law and economics 
literature about possible legal implications of various behavioral biases 
(endowment, availability, et cetera), the legal discourse has been most affected 
by progress in behavioral economic research on other-regarding preferences. 
For most legal scholars, homo economicus—that notorious expected-utility 
maximizing (straw) man—is first and foremost a keenly self-interested person 
and, only secondly, an exponentially time-discounting one. And this is perfectly 
understandable. The standard model of rationality is not merely a descriptive 
model; it is also a normative theory about how people should behave if they are 
to be deemed rational (by the criteria of this theory, that is). As such, one could 
justifiably see the standard model as challenging other normative theories of 
behavior based on morality and ethics, which are so central to the law. 
A large body of evidence shows that people may systematically incur 
substantial costs to promote other people’s interests or just “to make a point.”23 
Stated otherwise, people regularly seem to care about others in the 
societyhence the terms “social preferences” and “other-regarding 
preferences.”24 Particular other-regarding preferences have been dubbed 
“fairness,” “reciprocity,” et cetera.25 At the basis of this literature lies a general 
postulate: that other people’s utility enters into one’s own utility function in a 
non-trivial way. In order to avoid tautology, economists need to suggest 
functional forms that represent the content, or structure, of other-regarding 
preferences. Joel Sobel, in a survey of other-regarding preferences, argues that 
the notion of preferences should be expanded by relaxing the assumption of 
individual greed.26 Sobel writes a simple general expression of individual utility 
that reflects this notion—ui(O(s);(s;θ))—where θ (theta) is the pivotal variable 
 
 23. See generally Colin Camerer & Ernst Fehr, When Does “Economic Man” Dominate Social 
Behavior?, 311 SCI. 47 (2006); Matthew Rabin, A Perspective on Psychology and Economics, 46 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 657 (2002). 
 24. Many economic discussions confusingly employ “social preferences” to denote “other-
regarding preferences.” This usage intermixes preferences of individuals with regard to other members 
of society with preferences of social groups. The latter type of preferences is highly problematic from 
an economic theory perspective, if not utterly denied. Yet this is not the case from the vantage point of 
psychology or other social sciences even if one prefers not to ascribe faculties of choice, tastes, and 
preferences to social groups. I, therefore, prefer the neutral term other-regarding preferences. 
 25. See, e.g., Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut & Kevin McCabe, Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History, 
10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 122 (1995); Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and 
Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281 (1993). 
 26. Joel Sobel, Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity, 43 J. ECON. LITERATURE 392, 392 
(2005). 
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as it describes personal characteristics.27 This expression allows for an 
individual’s utility to depend on outcomes that take into account 
interdependent utilities; it could also include elements that cannot be measured 
directly, “like a warm glow from giving.”28 Theta formalizes the idea that people 
differ in the utility they derive from different (broadly defined) outcomes. 
Furthermore, θ may be interpreted as equivalent to the concept of identity.29 
A common approach for demonstrating other-regarding preferences is to 
theorize a utility function from intuitive principles and support it with consistent 
experimental results.30 Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt advance a model featuring 
an aversion toward less equal outcomes.31 In this model, people are willing to 
give up some material payoff to move in the direction of more equal outcomes. 
Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin conceptualize people’s preference for 
fairness as consisting of their own individual utility and two additional 
components:32 One component is a Rawlsian maxim in care for the least 
advantaged in the society; the second component represents a universalistic 
concern for the total income of all societal members, equally weighted. The 
latter component may be viewed as a preference for general efficiency or social 
welfare. A third component based on reciprocity is added to account for 
retaliatory actions. We return to Sobel’s θ and to these functional forms below. 
2. Preferences Over the Unknown: Uncertainty and Ambiguity Aversion 
Individuals’ behavior under uncertainty exhibits systematic departures from 
the standard model of rational choice. Uncertainty is defined as the category of 
unknown events about which one does not have an estimate of the probabilities 
of their occurrence.33 Research indicates that people have an ambiguity 
 
 27. In this formulation,  is a parameter; s = (s1, . . . , si) is strategy profile (that is, individual i 
chooses si); O(s) denotes those generalized consumption goods whose production does not depend on θ 
and (s; θ). Id. at 402. 
 28. Id. See generally James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory 
of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464 (1990); James Andreoni, Privately Provided Public Goods in a 
Large Economy: The Limits of Altruism, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 57 (1988). See also Uzi Segal & Joel Sobel, 
Tit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity in Strategic Settings, 136 J. ECON. THEORY 197 
(2007). 
 29. For an economic modeling of identity, see George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 
Economics and Identity, 115 Q.J. ECON. 715 (2000). See also Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Identity, 
Morals and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets, 126 Q.J. Econ. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://idei.fr/ 
doc/by/tirole/identity2010_june.pdf. 
 30. See Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism—
Experimental Evidence and New Theories, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF GIVING, 
ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY 615 (Serge-Christophe Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier eds., 2006). 
 31. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation, 114 Q.J. 
ECON. 817 (1999). See also Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, 
and Competition, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 166 (2000). 
 32. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests, 117 Q.J. 
ECON. 817 (2002). See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 154–56 (1971) (discussing the maxim in 
care principle). 
 33. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19–20, 227 (1921). 
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aversion, also referred to as uncertainty aversion, which is distinguished from 
risk aversion.34 When asked to choose among future outcomes, people ascribe 
lower utilities to outcomes about which they do not know the probability of risk 
levels.35 Furthermore, a theoretical distinction has been made between objective 
rationality and subjective rationality in connection with ambiguity.36 Which 
rationality holds may depend on the individual’s culture or personality.37 
Ambiguity aversion leads people to behave more conservatively.38 Another 
important outcome of ambiguity aversion, among numerous others, is 
incomplete contracts.39 Interestingly, contract incompleteness associates directly 
with bounded rationality based on the insight that designing contractual 
covenants is cognitively costly.40 But ambiguity aversion also reflects a 
(negative) taste or preference for the unknowable; the ambiguous may be 
threatening and had rather be avoided. 
B. Constructed Preferences 
Another major challenge to the standard model of rational choice is the 
discovery that individuals’ preferences are context-contingent. They are 
constructed in a contingent fashion, rather than being fixed, comprehensive, 
and well-ranked.41 Moreover, preference construction may have an underlying 
mechanism such that there could be factors that may systematically cause 
people to resort to certain modes of decision-making.42 In the present context, 
we are interested in a special category of strategies for preference construction 
that involve reason-based choices. Here, individuals seek reasons to justify their 
choices and explain them to others. In a more general account of reason-based 
choice, individuals address difficult decisions—ones that involve conflict 
 
 34. See, e.g., Uzi Segal, The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion: An Anticipated Utility Approach, 
28 INT’L ECON. REV. 175 (1987). 
 35. See Yoram Halevy, Ellsberg Revisited: An Experimental Study, 75 ECONOMETRICA 503 (2007). 
 36. Itzhak Gilboa, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci & David Schmeidler, Objective and 
Subjective Rationality in a Multiple Prior Model, 78 ECONOMETRICS 755 (2008). 
 37. Id. at 756. 
 38. Sujoy Mukerji, A Survey of Some Applications of the Idea of Ambiguity Aversion in Economics, 
24 INT’L J. APPROXIMATE REASONING 221, 222 (2000). 
 39. Sujoy Mukerji, Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of Contractual Form, 88 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1207 (1998). 
 40. Jean Tirole, Cognition and Incomplete Contracts, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 265 (2009). 
 41. Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preferences, 50 AM. PSYCHOL. 364, 369 (1995) (“As a result of 
[] mental gymnastics, decision making is a highly contingent form of information processing, sensitive 
to task complexity, time pressure, response mode, framing, reference points, and numerous other 
contextual factors.”). See also Gregory W. Fischer et al., Goal-based Construction of Preferences: Task 
Goals and the Prominence Effect, 45 MGMT. SCI. 1057 (1999); Dan Ariely et al., Tom Sawyer and the 
Construction of Value, 60 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (2006). 
 42. The obligatory citation is to Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the 
Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129, 130 (1956) (describing a mental process dubbed “satisfycing” 
that may stem from one’s needs, drives, or goals;  this process is applicable to any organism). For 
further sources, see supra note 7. 
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between several good options or conflicting reasons for competing options—by 
seeking reasons to decide in a particular way.43 When people make decisions, 
they consider not only their preferences for different alternatives, but also 
guiding principles and behavioral rules. In other words, they follow 
“rationales”—meta-rules and principles.44 Importantly, rules relate to social 
norms, which may be seen as sitting higher in the hierarchy of reasons than 
preferences. 
Finally, in a conceptual paper that also deals with hierarchies of motivations, 
Keith Stanovich recently defined a “master rationality motive” (MRM) as a 
distinctive thinking disposition at a high level of generality. The MRM is the 
“motive that drives the search for rational integration across our preference 
hierarchies.”45 The MRM is the “desire to act in accordance with reasons, a 
desire that produces behavior, in your name, by adding its motivational force to 
that of whichever motives appear to provide the strongest reasons for acting.”46 
The MRM does not refer to how well people satisfy the choice axioms of utility 
theory, which may be called a “thin theory of rationality.”47 Rather, the MRM 
refers to a “broad theory of rationality” that encompasses self-criticism of one’s 
own desires and beliefs.48 
C. Toward Expanded Rationality 
The scholarly advances mentioned above point to the need for expanding 
the standard notion of rationality and, in fact, show that economists are already 
making progress in this direction. These “new rational preferences” are more 
individually subjective than the preferences postulated by the standard model. 
These new preferences are also more socially sensitive, as they take others more 
systematically into account. They are contextual, depending on the 
informational environment as well as on the social environment of norms and 
shared beliefs. These new preferences, moreover, seem to be linked to deep 
mental processes that may be common to several phenomena. These new 
preferences thus turn the focus from rationalizing choice decisions on formal 
bases to justifying them with good reasons. 
 
 43. Eldar Shafir, Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNITION 11 
(1993). 
 44. On Amir & Dan Ariely, Decisions by Rules: The Case of Unwillingness to Pay for Beneficial 
Delays, 44 J. MARKETING RES. 142, 143 (2007). 
 45. Keith E. Stanovich, Higher-Order Preferences and the Master Rationality Motive, 14 THINKING 
& REASONING 111, 119 (2008). 
 46. Id. (quoting J.D. Velleman, What Happens When Somebody Acts?, 101 MIND 461, 479 (1992)). 
 47. Id. at 121. 
 48. Stanovich’s idea of contingent ordering of motivations according to a higher-level ranking is 
reminiscent of Amartya Sen’s concept of meta-ranking; namely, a ranking of sets of preference 
orderings according to some moral principle. See AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND 
MEASUREMENT 100–01 (1982); AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 17–18 (2002). 
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Behavioral economics, however, so far has failed to consider a general 
framework for analyzing individuals’ motivational goals—what may be called 
“the desirable.” For those who seek such a framework in their pursuit of a more 
general theory of rationality, values may be the Holy Grail, sweeping as this 
assertion must sound. As conceptions of the desirable, values may provide a 
good framework for expanding the concept of rationality beyond the confines 
of the traditional model, while preserving parsimony and theoretical rigor and 
allowing for deriving testable hypotheses. This section suggests aspects in which 
the theory of values complements current accounts in behavioral economics and 
aspects in which the former may be used to expand the latter. 
1. Values-Based Utility 
One will find it difficult to miss the remarkable overlap between the nature 
of values and the grounds that behavioral economists seek for expanding the 
frontiers of rationality. The values model appears to satisfy the requirement 
mentioned above for psychological observations that apply generally. The 
theoretical model provides a concise yet complete model of human 
motivational goals. The ten values and their interrelations may point the way 
toward a unifying theory of human motivation—a way for organizing the 
different needs, motives, and goals proposed by other theories.49 The model 
transcends situations, well beyond economic exchanges, and has been validated 
to hold nearly universally. 
The values model thus can mesh well in, and further enrich, current 
economic models. Consider Sobel’s θ.50 Theta comprises the individual’s 
personal characteristics—in particular, how one assesses different outcomes and 
the utility one derives from these outcomes. Yet θ is only a receptacle; it should 
be written θ(·) to denote that it has arguments. To be meaningful, θ(·) must 
encompass a comprehensive, yet final, set of goals and criteria with which to 
assess outcomes. This is precisely the role of values. Representing the set of 
conceptions of the desirable, the distinct ten values in the values model can be 
seen as ten distinct arguments in individuals’ utility functions—as thetas with 
ten different subscripts. This article will also generalize Sobel’s account from 
one dealing only with other-regarding preferences to a full account of all the 
individual motivational goals.51 
The contribution of the values theory lies in defining a finite set of 
arguments that are both universal and comprehensive. It may enable a modeler 
to avoid the pitfalls of tautology—namely, allowing anything and everything 
into the definition of utility, or writing a different model for each case. Granted, 
there may be many issues that different people in different social groups may 
 
 49. Schwartz, supra note 5. 
 50. Sobel, supra notes 26, 27. 
 51. Additional subscripted thetas could refer to other universal individual factors, for example, 
beliefs. See Leung, supra note 18. 
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consider important, desirable, legitimate, and so forth. The theory and evidence 
indicate that these issues would fall into one of the ten domains in the model—
that is, that there is “no motivation left behind.” In tandem, many particular 
values may be idiosyncratic to certain national or local groups (thus falling into 
different domains in samples from different groups), and therefore should not 
be used in a general model. In such cases, the model would indicate that these 
values—and the respective preferences they correlate with—may be 
inappropriate for analytical use beyond those groups. 
In addition to identifying motivationally distinct values, the theory also 
specifies a structure of values, namely, the dynamics of conflict and congruence 
among them. These dynamics are backed by concrete cross-correlation 
matrices. Economists seeking to make their models more attuned to insights 
from psychology thus may want to incorporate this feature into the models. For 
example, consider a purely altruistic behavior: making an anonymous donation 
to a non-governmental organization that runs a clinic in a developing country. 
Such behavior will be more likely among people high in universalism. The 
structural features of the model suggest that this behavior will be less likely 
among individuals who put a high priority on power, which also encompasses 
wealth attainment. This highlights the fact that values may operate both as 
“pull” (positive valence) factors for behaviors that are conceptually compatible, 
and as “push” (negative valence) for incompatible behaviors. The model further 
suggests that this behavior will be unrelated to security values, for instance, and 
to value priorities on the conservation versus openness-to-change dimension 
more generally. 
2. Other-Regarding Preferences 
It requires little effort to observe the conceptual link between self-
transcendence values and other-regarding preferences, or the link between self-
enhancement values and self-utility in the traditional expected-utility 
maximization model. The values theory again may enrich the economic 
accounts through its structural features. Self-regarding preferences comprise 
seeking pure pleasure for oneself, which corresponds with hedonistic values, as 
well as other forms of attaining both material and non-material utility, which is 
covered by achievement and partially by power values. So these issues are 
related, as one would expect, but also distinct from one another. 
On the opposite pole of this dimension, the values theory distinguishes two 
types of other-regarding motivations. Altruistic preferences directed to 
particular others from one’s in-group are conceptually compatible with 
benevolence values. More open-ended other-regarding preferences are 
compatible with Schwartz’s universalism. Among current models of other-
regarding preferences, Charness and Rabin’s model better captures the notion 
of universalism, especially through the factor of caring for the total utility and 
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welfare in society, but also through the Rawlsian caring for a (presumably 
random) least-advantaged member of society.52 This model nonetheless fails to 
consider utility derived from caring for impersonal objects such as the 
environment. The values theory and evidence suggest that similar motivations 
may lie behind this type of utility. In comparison, Fehr and Schmidt’s model 
revolves around the inequality between an individual’s income and the income 
of others.53 This model is silent on the question whether the “others” whose 
income one considers do or do not belong to one’s in-group. Indeed, the model 
fits results from anonymous Ultimatum and other games. It therefore fails to 
reflect the difference between benevolence and universal motivations. 
3. Uncertainty and Ambiguity Aversion 
Next, consider uncertainty and ambiguity aversion. This type of preference 
is conceptually compatible with high priority on conservation values, while 
lower ambiguity aversion is compatible with openness-to-change. People who, 
relative to others, put a high priority on having new experiences (stimulation) 
and on independently guiding their own life (self-direction) would be more 
willing to face unforeseeable contingencies. In contrast, people for whom 
security, stability, and order (security, tradition) are of high importance would 
see the unpredictable as threatening and aversive. The emphasis on preserving 
the status quo—whether real or an imaginary ideal-type (for example, 
“protecting family values”)—is especially clear in such value items as respect 
for tradition, honoring parents and elders, and social order. The preference for 
certainty and stability over ambiguity and change is also reflected in seemingly 
innocuous value items, like cleanliness, that convey a sense of clarity.54 
More broadly, values that express prevention-of-loss goals stand against 
values expressing promotion-of-gain goals (see Figure 1). This distinction draws 
on a theory of regulatory focus.55 In this theory, hedonic preferences are not 
continuous. Rather, the domain of losses—in particular, loss avoidance—is 
distinct from the domain of gains, specifically, gain approach.56 (The link to 
Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory had been noted.)57 This broad 
distinction parallels another distinction—between anxiety-based values and 
anxiety-free values. The values theory thus suggests that uncertainty and 
 
 52. Charness & Rabin, supra note 32. 
 53. Fehr & Schmidt, supra note 30. 
 54. Cf. John T. Jost et al., Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, 129 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 339, 346 (2003). 
 55. E. Tory Higgins, Beyond Pleasure and Pain, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 1280 (1997). 
 56. Id. See also Vered Halamish et al., Regulatory Focus Effects on Discounting over Uncertainty 
for Losses vs. Gains, 29 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 654 (2008); Lorraine Chen Idson, Nira Liberman & E. Tory 
Higgins, Distinguishing Gains from Nonlosses and Losses from Nongains: A Regulatory Focus 
Perspective on Hedonic Intensity, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 252 (2000); Leigh Ann Vaughn, 
Jolie Baumann & Christine Klemann, Openness to Experience and Regulatory Focus: Evidence of 
Motivation from Fit, 42 J. RES. PERSONALITY 886 (2008). 
 57. Higgins, supra note 55, at 1293. 
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ambiguity will be more threatening among individuals who, relative to others, 
emphasize power, security, conformity, and tradition. These people will be 
more likely to prefer actions and policies that promise to sustain order and 
avoid the need to face uncertainty. The opposite will be true for people who are 
high on self-direction and universalism.58 
This broad distinction can be further extended to values that express 
complexity aversion versus values that express comfort with complexity.59 The 
pivotal observation here is that complex situations involving many alternatives 
or several conflicting considerations resemble ambiguous situations. Decision-
making in such situations is more cognitively taxing.60 In the context of political 
ideology, Philip Tetlock defined individuals’ integrative complexity as the 
extent of differentiation among multiple perspectives or dimensions and the 
higher order integration or synthesis of these differentiated components.61 In the 
economic literature, too, complexity in choice decisions has been shown to 
invoke negative responses.62 
The foregoing suggests that uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity overlap 
somewhat. With too many moving parts to follow, people lose focus, the picture 
blurs, and ambiguity reigns supreme. Since everybody is cognitively bounded, 
everybody, at some point, “satisfices” when facing a complex or ambiguous 
situation. We can therefore consider self-transcendence and openness-to-
change as high-complexity values, as they call for contemplating numerous 
(sometimes conflicting) objects, and for accommodating uncertainty and 
ambiguity. Conservation and self-enhancement can be considered as low-
complexity values, as they call for focusing on fewer objects—primarily 
oneself—and for avoiding uncertainty and ambiguity. 
People indeed differ in their modes of addressing ambiguous or complex 
situations. These differences stem from individual traits and from situational 
factors. A series of studies demonstrated the effect of both channels. 
Individuals’ dislike of integratively complex alternatives correlates positively 
 
 58. The link to political ideologies has been surveyed extensively. See Jost et al., supra note 54. 
 59. Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive 
Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 668 (2004). 
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with a higher need for cognitive closure63 and with conservative political 
ideologies.64 A higher level of integrative complexity correlates positively with 
higher priorities on self-transcendence values and negatively with emphasizing 
self-enhancement values.65 Higher need for closure correlates highly positively 
with conservation values (security, tradition, and conformity) and highly 
negatively with openness-to-change values (stimulation and self-direction).66 
Moreover, as the level of need for cognitive closure rises, people are more likely 
to fall back on “standard solutions” to problems suggested by their culture. In 
ambiguous, complex social interactions, cultural norms provide easily accessible 
heuristics for reaching satisfactory solutions because they can be easily 
justified.67 
4. Preference Construction and Related Mechanisms 
Let us now turn to the remaining issues identified in the literature as 
developments in, or challenges to, the standard model of rationality. The values 
theory provides a general framework, within which one can situate the concept 
of preference construction and related concepts. To the extent that preference 
construction is guided by reasons or principles, and behavioral rules informed 
by culture and social norms, values define both the vocabulary for, and the 
intensity of, these factors. 
Recasting Stanovich’s MRM in a values mold yields particularly fruitful 
observations. At the heart of this “desire to act in accordance with reasons,” 
there lies a process seeking “that of whichever motives appear to provide the 
strongest reasons for acting.”68 What makes the MRM unique is its meta- 
(“master”) rationality character—the ability to engage in self-criticism, to 
consider conceptually conflicting goals, and to apply higher-order preferences 
to them.69 As trans-situational goals or criteria, values define higher-order 
preferences. The values theory—in particular, the circular model of values—
provides structure to the notion of conflicting goals and low-level preferences as 
it postulates the relationships of conflict and congruence among values. When 
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the MRM mulls over conflicting goals, it essentially deliberates which actions 
are more in line with the values one cherishes. 
In tandem, the MRM theory explicates how the values model can support a 
theory of expanded rationality notwithstanding the fact that this model does not 
satisfy the requirement for consistency as stipulated in the traditional model of 
procedural rationality.70 Both the values and the MRM theories indeed 
repudiate this requirement. Both theories postulate that, in situations laden 
with meaning—a category that is far broader than those situations whose 
outcome can be quantified in some commensurable way—conflicting 
motivations may point to conflicting (or at least inconsistent) behaviors. Which 
motivation will prevail may depend on peripheral circumstances, in breach of 
the traditional model but in keeping with the values and the MRM model. For 
example, an individual may cherish her personal independence as part of her 
special emphasis on self-direction. But when this individual’s security is 
threatened (including through experimental priming) she may forego a self-
expressing behavior to preserve security. This would not prove that she is 
irrational. It would suggest, as Stanovich emphasizes, that she is meta-rational 
and demonstrate the usefulness of the expanded rationality framework 
advanced here. 
IV 
LAW: UNDERSTANDING THE REQUIRED 
Drawing on the analytical framework developed in the preceding parts, this 
part argues that a values-based theory of expanded rationality can make a 
significant contribution to our understanding of the law. The key point is that 
the law deals with the desirable. Jurisprudence scholars have been discussing 
the relations between law and morality, the greater good, or religious 
injunctions for generations. This is not the subject of the present discussion. 
Without going into too much detail, it appears reasonable to assume that the 
law expresses a stance about the way things ought to be, including the structure 
of social institutions and individuals’ behavior. The law is a system of 
prescriptive norms, not descriptive ones. There is therefore a close conceptual 
proximity between the law and values as conceptions of the desirable. The 
better we understand how individuals perceive and deal with the desirable, the 
better we can analyze the law as the central social institution intended for 
guiding people’s behavior toward socially desirable goals; a fortiori for 
economic analysis of law. 
This part demonstrates the link between values, expanded rationality, and 
the law through a number of central issues concerning both the content of the 
law and its operation. Specifically, this part deals with legal rules of conduct, 
law abidingness, implications of value diversity in society, and value conflict. It 
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will demonstrate the potential contribution of this mode of analysis to 
understanding how the law operates. As will become clear below, the present 
account is not a normative theory, among other things, because the present 
account clarifies that what people consider normative or desirable may depend 
on their values. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the present 
discussion concentrates on the individual level of analysis. This part deals with 
the way individuals perceive the desirable (through values) and the individual 
perspective to the law—that is, “law for the common man.” References to 
forming legal policy will be from this perspective as well. One could discuss the 
content of the law and the rule of law—as opposed to law abidingness—as 
social institutions at the societal level of analysis, but this would be a separate 
and different analysis from the present one.71 
A. Values and the Content of Law 
Similar to the general economic literature, the law and economics literature 
relies on the narrow, yet theoretically sound, foundations of the standard 
model. The values-based expanded rationality approach presented here does 
not dispute the basic premise that people respond to incentives. A standard 
economic analysis of a legal issue seeks to investigate how different legal 
mechanisms may guide behavior. Such an analysis might help private parties to 
better plan their moves and assist lawmakers in designing legal reform with a 
view to influence individuals’ behavior, for example, in order to maximize total 
social welfare, effect a more just distribution of resources, or some other 
normative criterion. 
A values-based expanded rationality expands, in a structured manner, the 
notion of individual utility and the incentives one faces by defining a diverse set 
of potentially desirable values. This diversity allows for diversity of goals within 
individuals and groups. For individuals, a diversity of values enables one to 
analyze incentives in light of the conceptual meaning of the law, and not only in 
light of its material cost or benefit or the hedonic pleasure or pain that it may 
bring about. When an individual faces a certain legal rule, that rule affects her 
payoffs according to the values that it invokes and the individual’s preferences 
with regard to such values. 
For example, consider a law imposing a sales tax on automobiles. In terms 
of material payoffs, the tax sets an identical incentive for all individuals in the 
society as a regular monetary cost (putting aside differences in income levels 
and marginal utility of income). This is the standard economic analysis. Now 
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assume that this tax is a “green tax” such that higher polluting  automobiles and 
those with less efficient gas consumption are subject to it. In the standard 
economic analysis, nothing changes unless we add an ad hoc tautological 
assumption about a special taste for environmental protection. In contrast, a 
values-based expanded rationality points to an additional utility deriving from 
universalism values, which encompass the environment—an effect that a regular 
sales tax does not engender. Andrew Green, in fact, argues that monetary 
incentives in the form of subsidies may “crowd out” (dampen) the impact of 
environmental values and that environmental protection norms should be 
internalized through values.72 
In fact, a substantial part of the law—perhaps most of it—may be perceived 
by individuals as only marginally relevant from a pecuniary point of view but of 
utmost significance in other respects. Defining the utility that people derive 
from numerous laws cannot persuasively be based on the standard model. The 
quintessential example for this kind of law is the freedom of expression. In the 
vast scholarly and jurisprudential discussion on freedom of expression, two 
major rationales for its legal protection have been advanced: one dealing with 
the public aspect73 and one that focuses on the individual aspect. Courts and 
scholars have conceptualized the individual-based rationale as “self-fulfillment” 
or “individual self-realization.”74 Citing a powerful line of authorities, Justice 
Stevens recently summarized the individual-based rationale: “One fundamental 
concern of the First Amendment is to ‘protec[t] the individual’s interest in self-
expression.’ Freedom of speech helps ‘make men free to develop their 
faculties,’ it respects their ‘dignity and choice,’ and it facilitates the value of 
‘individual self-realization.’”75 
In term of its conceptual content meaning, freedom of expression reflects 
primarily the value of self-direction. Freedom of expression is conceptually 
consistent with notions of independence, liberty, creativity, and curiosity, which 
reflect this value in the Schwartz model. Freedom of expression, in its bolder 
version—for example, in artistic works—also expresses the value of stimulation, 
which is reflected in notions of novelty, excitement, and variety. Justice 
Stevens’s proposition constitutes a descriptive, empirical assertion that self-
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direction is a universal value—one that is recognized and appreciated by all 
individuals—as well as a normative claim that the law should protect people’s 
ability to realize this value. Freedom of expression may have socially beneficial 
implications—for example, for the democratic process—and it may also have 
material implications, such as for commercial purposes, as in the market for 
artworks. But the latter facets do not exhaust the values of self-direction and 
stimulation such that any analysis of the freedom of expression that ignores 
these values will be lacking and will likely yield skewed policy implications. 
These two examples—the “green” tax and freedom of expression—
demonstrate how the content of the law may reflect different values. These 
examples refer to values located on the two higher-level dimensions in the 
values circle: universalism on the self-transcendence pole and self-direction on 
the openness-to-change pole. Other laws may reflect other values, and in many 
cases, more than one value. The circular model of values suggests that when a 
certain law more powerfully expresses (that is, is conceptually consistent with) a 
particular value, it is more likely to similarly express, albeit more weakly, the 
adjacent values on the circle and be conceptually opposed to the values located 
on the opposite part of the circle. 
B. Values and Obeying the Law 
One of the most successful propositions in the economic analysis of law is 
Gary Becker’s seminal model of deterrence.76 Becker has shown how law 
abidingness (avoidance of crime) may depend positively on the magnitude of 
the sanction imposed for the offense and on the probability of imposing this 
sanction, namely, the probability of finding the perpetrator, convicting, and 
punishing her. Becker’s model is purely economic—a model of incentives. 
Becker’s article spawned voluminous scholarship on economic analysis of 
criminal law, which need not be surveyed here as it shares with Becker’s 
original article the basic reasonable premise that, like any other activity, 
criminal activity responds to incentives. This holds true for negative incentives 
that are either material, such as fines, or hedonic, such as incarceration. 
Notwithstanding the model’s solid internal logic, which renders it so convincing, 
some empirical evidence questions the effectiveness of deterrence in 
engendering legal compliance. For instance, Robert MacCoun has found that 
deterrence may account for only five percent of the variability of criminal 
activity.77 
Starting in the mid-1990s, law and economics began, and has continued, to 
expand the analysis of compliance by referring to social incentives of shaming 
 
 76. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
 77. Robert J. MacCoun, Drugs and the Law: A Psychological Analysis of Drug Prohibition, 113 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 497 (1993). 
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and stigma.78 The central idea motivating this discourse is that, even in the 
absence of material or hedonic incentives—when standard deterrence for fear 
of the law is unlikely because fines are negligible and the probability of arrest 
and conviction is low—people may nonetheless obey the law in order to avoid 
public shame. In contrast with regular enforcement mechanisms of police forces 
and prisons, shaming is cheap. On its face, shaming does not require any 
resources—especially not state resources—beyond means for disseminating 
information about the shameful conduct. 
Shaming could either serve as a substitute for standard enforcement through 
deterrence or as a complement to it.79 Be that as it may, however, from the 
standpoint of the potential shamer, who must deliberate whether to shame 
someone because the latter has breached the law, the key question is whether 
one should obey the law. Even if one assumes that the cost of shaming is zero, 
or close to that—indeed, especially when no material incentives exist—one 
should still point to the motivational factors that cause societal members 
actually to shame offenders. Even an economic analysis that is not based on 
regular deterrence has to identify a mechanism that motivates legal compliance 
and engenders a perception of legal compliance as desirable in the eyes of 
societal members, who are expected to obey the law—especially in the eyes of 
potential shaming agents and their audience.80 
Lawrence Kohlberg has related law abidingness with stages of moral 
development.81 At the pre-conventional stage of Kohlberg’s theory, children 
obey for fear of punishment, which is similar to the standard deterrence-based 
 
 78. See, e.g., Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, 96 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1652 (2006); Patricia Funk, On the Effective Use of Stigma as Crime Deterrent. 48 EUR. ECON. 
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POL’Y & L. 645 (1997). For an analysis of the limits of enforcement through stigma, see Alon Harel & 
Alon Klement, The Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection of Crime May Result in Less 
Stigmatization, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 355 (2007). 
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norms, see, for example, Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 
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See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). In such communities, there may 
be an additional incentive to build reputation, but, as noted, the empirical evidence suggests that even 
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transgression or to make a point. 
 81. See generally LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL 
STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (1981); Lawrence Kohlberg, The Development of Children’s 
Orientations Toward a Moral Order: Sequence in the Development of Moral Thought, 51 HUM. DEV. 8 
(2008). Each of the three stages mentioned in the text consists of two sub-stages, which I abstract from 
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model. At the conventional stage, adults view law abidingness as necessary for 
preserving social order. At the post-conventional stage, individuals may give 
priority to personal moral considerations over law abidingness. Research by 
Tom Tyler and his colleagues empirically examines the question of why people 
obey the law and answers, in brief, that they do so when the procedure is fair.82 
In his original pioneering study, Tyler has shown that people who were indicted 
in a local traffic court in Chicago were more likely to comply with injunctions 
against them when they perceived the legal procedure as fair. This was 
especially the case when people were given an opportunity to participate in the 
process, when the process was neutral, and when they were treated with respect. 
Tyler’s procedural justice theory thus focuses on the link between law 
abidingness and aspects of identity and the extent to which an individual may 
view legal compliance as a conduct that stems from oneself rather than one that 
is forced upon one through deterrence. 
The values theory, as a general theory of motivational goals, may provide 
additional directions toward a better understanding of legal compliance. The 
key point, again, is that legal compliance would be perceived by the individual 
as desirable, right, and legitimate. Of particular interest is the issue of obeying 
the law as such “because it’s the law.” Greater compliance when the conceptual 
content of the law is consistent with the values that the individual holds dear 
may be analyzed in the framework presented in the preceding section on values 
and the content of laws. Compliance in that case will reflect a positive response 
to incentives according to the proposed definition of expanded rationality. This 
is compliance “because it is worthwhile.” Explaining compliance with the law as 
such when the individual is indifferent to the content of the law is more 
challenging because one would need to point out a motivation that is strong 
enough to overcome the cost of legal compliance in the absence of deterrence. 
Hence, the hypothesis would be that individuals will be more likely to support 
obeying the law—by themselves or by others—if legal compliance is per se 
consistent with their value preferences. 
Which value preferences may support law abidingness? The answer depends 
on the role the law plays in the eyes of the individual, and it appears that this 
answer may vary depending on her value preferences. Individuals whose 
worldview emphasizes elements of protection, stability, and anxiety will tend to 
see the law as a framework that creates a social foundation, provides certainty, 
protects against threats, and is anchored in past traditions and received wisdom. 
One may expect, generally, that such people will view obeying the law as the 
very essence of this conduct—compliance for the sake of compliance—and will 
consider it as right and desirable. In contrast, individuals whose worldview 
emphasizes change, self-development, and lack of anxiety may find value in the 
law mainly as an instrument—either for protecting personal interests (such as 
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property, reputation, or privacy) or for promoting moral ideas (such as 
equality). 
The main dimension over which we would expect to observe variability in 
the link between law abidingness and values thus will be conservation versus 
openness-to-change. Law abidingness correlates most strongly with higher 
conformity and security, as well as tradition, because law often has historical 
roots. On the self-enhancement versus self-transcendence dimension, opposite 
factors may actually affect compliance. A preference for self-enhancement 
values is consistent with law abidingness only insofar as it may serve the 
individual’s interests—something that the law may do, as noted above. 
However, individuals with a strong preference for power values might also view 
the law as a constraint and obstruction to personal aggrandizement. Self-
transcendence values emphasize the legitimacy of law and of legal compliance 
due to their egalitarian quality. At the same time, however, such values may 
support a critical attitude toward the law inasmuch as it provides a formal 
approval to a morally reprehensible conduct or hinders following a moral 
injunction that one personally holds dear. People located on both poles of this 
dimension thus may obey the law grudgingly or conditionally—possibly under 
the shadow of deterrence—more than from internal motivation. 
This brief analysis is consistent with Kohlberg’s approach and with Tyler’s 
findings. It should be noted that in Kohlberg’s theory, law abidingness is not 
always desirable. Obeying the law as such characterizes the conventional middle 
stage. Compliance as a convention, in order to be in line with the general social 
order, reflects values of conformity and tradition. In contrast, the higher, post-
conventional stage legitimizes breaking the law for ethical, extra-legal reasons 
that each individual is supposed to assess independently.83 
Tyler’s findings, too, are in line with the present argument. The measures 
found to contribute to legal compliance trigger universalism values—by 
enhancing equality in the process, and self-direction values—by providing 
individuals an opportunity to express themselves. These measures may affect 
the set of marginal, or swinging, individuals. People who are high in conformity 
and in conservation values more generally will tend to obey the law due to their 
consistent internal motivations. They do not need any procedural 
encouragement. People who are especially high on power values may see their 
personal welfare as the supreme interest. In extreme cases, no amount of voice 
or fair process would change this motivation (deterrence, too, has limits). 
People high on universalism or self-direction, however, may be influenced if the 
content meaning of the process is consistent with these values. Elements of 
participation, neutrality, and respect thus may reflect the equality facet of 
universalism. Providing an opportunity for substantive voice may cause a 
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person to view the process as something she could direct, at least in part, and 
thus enhance its legitimization and compliance by the individual and by others.84 
A study by Ella Daniel and Ariel Knafo reports findings in line with the 
present theory.85 These authors investigated value preferences and attitudes 
toward law abidingness in samples of Israeli students and youths, including 
immigrants.86 The study’s central hypothesis, that law abidingness will correlate 
positively with conformity values, received strong support in all the participant 
groups. In addition, participants exhibited a negative correlation between law 
abidingness on the one hand and universalism and self-direction values on the 
other. Interestingly, the authors also report a weak but significant negative 
correlation between power and achievement values and attitudes in support of 
law abidingness. This finding is in line with the above hypothesis, that 
individuals who give special emphasis to self-enhancement may perceive the 
law as an unwelcome obstacle to pursuing their self-interest. 
C. Value Diversity in Groups 
The analysis in the preceding section on different attitudes toward legal 
compliance is a specific aspect of the broader issue concerning legal design in an 
environment of diversity in value preferences within groups. From the vantage 
point of policy and lawmakers, the theory of values-based expanded rationality 
points to the need to consider a variety of value preferences in the population. 
This point invokes an old bone of contention in the economic literature—
namely, whether, for economic analysis purposes, one may assume that 
preferences are uniform. George Stigler and Gary Becker, who are among the 
prominent proponents of the standard model of rationality, famously argued 
that an economic analysis may concentrate only on differences in prices or 
income in order to explain differences or changes in behavior, based on the 
assumption that individuals’ preferences are uniform: “[T]astes neither change 
capriciously nor differ importantly between people. On this interpretation one 
does not argue over tastes for the same reason that one does not argue over the 
Rocky Mountains—both are there, will be there next year, too, and are the 
same to all men.”87 
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LICHT 2/2/2011   
200 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 74:175 
Doubtless, the assumption that preferences are uniform is a convenient one 
for policymakers and not only for economic modelers. Adopting this 
assumption allows the policymaker to propose measures such that the marginal 
individual in the population will respond only to changes in prices, income, or 
wealth. As the economic research on non-standard preferences developed, 
however, it became necessary also to address the distribution of these 
preferences in the population. Fehr and Schmidt thus analyze the distribution of 
other-regarding preferences in light of empirical data on this subject.88 As we 
expand the set of arguments in the personal utility function, and the notion of 
rationality more generally, economists and policymakers influenced by 
economic analysis will have to take this aspect into consideration. In this 
context, too, the values-based model provides a framework for theoretical 
analysis and empirical testing. 
Suppose that in order to increase the likelihood that a certain law will enjoy 
voluntary compliance, lawmakers (be they legislators or judges) would like to 
design the law such that it fits the taste of the majority of people. In other 
words, the content meaning of the law should be in line with the value 
preferences of the majority of the population or at least with that of the median 
member. Such a law will be viewed by the populace as legitimate, right, and 
desirable. Consequently, there will be less need to rely on people’s willingness 
to obey the law as such, or on deterrence, in order to ensure compliance. One 
may further assume that politicians are skilled in identifying the public’s value 
preferences and in addressing the public in value terms in order to trigger the 
responses they want—from electing them to office89 to supporting a particular 
legislation.90 
Diversity of value preferences within the population, however, may cause 
difficulties in legal design. This may be the case when there is a difference 
between the value preference distribution among the general public and the 
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distribution among a sub-group of the population toward which the law is 
directed and that is expected to comply. In this situation, lawmakers may face a 
tension between the need to achieve legitimization—perhaps even authority—
from the general public and the desire to design an effective law—one that 
triggers values that are endorsed by the group to which this law is directed. 
To see this point, consider a fundamental subject in corporate law—the 
objectives of the corporation. Corporate fiduciaries must act, in unbending 
loyalty and due care, in the best interest of the corporation. Since the 
corporation is a purely legal construct, this doctrine hinges on the question of to 
which real parties corporations ultimately owe their fiduciary duties. In the 
United States and in most other common law jurisdictions, the answer 
traditionally has been the shareholders.91 Nevertheless, a debate has been raging 
for decades between this view, known as either the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm or the shareholder primacy norm, and an opposite view—
known as the stakeholder approach—which calls on corporate fiduciaries to 
also take into account the interests of multiple other constituencies, including 
employees, creditors, customers, the community, and more.92 
Analyzing the basic positions in this debate in light of the values theory 
indicates that each position is consistent with a different profile of value.93 On 
the self-enhancement versus self-transcendence dimension, the shareholder-
primacy approach is consistent with values of power and achievement, while the 
multiple-stakeholder approach is consistent with emphasizing universalism. On 
the conservation versus openness-to-change dimension, there may be opposite 
factors at play. On the one hand, giving primacy to a single constituency—the 
shareholders—sets a clear, bright-line rule and is thus consistent with aversion 
to ambiguity and complexity, which is linked to security values. A multiple-
stakeholder rule suggests a mirror image: complexity and uncertainty, which are 
consistent with self-direction and stimulation. On the other hand, giving 
primacy to shareholders reflects a preference for entrepreneurship and 
expresses the nature of the business corporation as a vehicle for venturing. It is 
therefore linked conceptually to self-direction and openness-to-change more 
generally. As noted above, board members and chief executive officers (CEOs) 
of business corporations exhibit a positive correlation between a general pro-
shareholder stance and entrepreneurial values—power, achievement, and self-
direction—and a negative link to universalism. Moreover, board members and 
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CEOs emphasize these entrepreneurial values more strongly than a 
representative sample of the population.94 
The foregoing discussion may shed light on the design of the legal regime on 
this subject. While the general doctrine in the United States gives clear priority 
to shareholders,95 some state legislatures recognize the concurrent legitimacy of 
other constituencies, and some courts have entertained this idea as well. In 
Canada, the Supreme Court has endorsed a multiple-stakeholder approach 
more broadly.96 Calls on corporations to exhibit greater “corporate social 
responsibility”—one of the versions of a multiple-stakeholder approach—are 
often heard from politicians and other social activists. Furthermore, many 
subscribe to the view that such an approach is a sound business strategy, which, 
in the long run, will also benefit shareholders.97 
Thus, while there exist two possible legal strategies for regulating this 
corporate fiduciary duty, at least in common law jurisdictions, the shareholder-
primacy doctrine is given clear priority. But why? First, the link between each 
legal strategy and a particular profile of value preferences suggests that, for 
each strategy, there exists a group of individuals in the population that views 
this strategy as right and desirable because of the values that these individuals 
in general hold as guiding principles in their life.98 This is the reason why the 
shareholder–stakeholder debate will never be settled—because it cannot be, 
since people may always differ on their primary goals in life.99 
Second, continuing this debate ad infinitum is a luxury that residents of the 
ivory tower may afford. Lawmakers must reach a resolution and provide 
guidance about the prevailing doctrine. Endorsing the shareholder-primacy 
norm has two advantages in this regard. First, this doctrine stipulates a clear 
rule, which is (relatively) easy to implement and is (relatively) easy to verify in 
court. Second, the shareholder-primacy norm is consistent with the value profile 
more commonly found among managers than in the general population. 
Consequently, it may be easier to apply this norm to all managers even if as a 
second best. As the law must impose a uniform regime—that is, one for all 
managers (and all judges)—a legal strategy of the second best is not only 
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reasonable, but practically inevitable. There is reason to believe that Adolf 
Berle—the pioneering scholarly proponent of the shareholder-primacy norm—
had realized this much nearly eighty years ago. Personally, Berle thought that 
business corporations should be managed for the benefit of all social 
constituencies. But as a practical legal matter, Berle realized that the multiple-
stakeholder approach cannot be implemented as a legal doctrine with sufficient 
clarity, leading him to support shareholder primacy as a second best option in 
an imperfect world.100 
D. Values Conflict and the Application of Law 
Finally, this section addresses the link between values conflict and the law. 
While this issue may be less directly related to the discussion of rationality, it 
touches upon a fundamental legal problem—in particular, one that arises in 
constitutional jurisprudence. The following discussion, therefore, cannot be 
considered as more than just scratching the surface of the subject and is 
intended mostly to reveal its link to the general analytical framework presented 
here. A fuller treatment must await another opportunity. 
A long-standing debate in constitutional jurisprudence deals with the proper 
role of values. While some scholars deliberately avoid providing a positive 
definition of public values,101 Owen Fiss holds that “[t]he task of the judge is to 
give meaning to constitutional values. . . . He searches for what is true, right, or 
just.”102 Concurring with William Eskridge that “[p]ublic values have a 
gravitational force,”103 Aharon Barak nonetheless conjectures that “[l]egal 
science has not yet developed a satisfactory ‘theory of values,’ and it is 
questionable whether such a theory could ever be developed.”104 
Even if legal science may not have yet developed a satisfactory theory of 
values, it seems that psychological science has made considerable inroads 
toward dispelling the doubt as to whether such a theory could ever be 
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developed. In fact, former Justice Souter recently put forward a crisp account of 
values’ role in constitutional law, which sounds remarkably close to the 
psychological theory of values: 
The explicit terms of the Constitution, in other words, can create a conflict of 
approved values, and the explicit terms of the Constitution do not resolve that conflict 
when it arises . . . . A choice may have to be made, not because language is vague but 
because the Constitution embodies the desire of the American people, like most 
people, to have things both ways. We want order and security, and we want liberty. 
And we want not only liberty but equality as well. These paired desires of ours can 
clash, and when they do a court is forced to choose between them, between one 
constitutional good and another one.105 
Souter echoes Fiss’s understanding of values as ideas about what is true, 
right, and just—a direct parallel to the definition of values as conceptions of the 
desirable. By observing that people desire “to have things both ways,” Souter 
points to the fact that nearly all values are desirable and that they come in pairs 
of inherently conflicting goals, thus capturing the interrelations between values 
that the psychological theory postulates. Souter thus echoes Isaiah Berlin’s 
famous observation, that “[t]he need to choose, to sacrifice some ultimate 
values to others, turns out to be a permanent characteristic of the human 
predicament.”106 Souter further identifies prominent values that represent both 
of the dimensions in the Schwartz model: security versus liberty on conservation 
versus openness-to-change, and equality (in universalism) on self-enhancement 
versus self-transcendence.107 Finally, in a rather piercing remark, Souter 
identifies the link between ambiguity aversion and the preference for security: 
I have to believe that something deeper is involved, and that behind most dreams of a 
simpler Constitution there lies a basic human hunger for the certainty and control that 
the fair reading model seems to promise. And who has not felt that same hunger? Is 
there any one of us who has not lived through moments, or years, of longing for a 
world without ambiguity, and for the stability of something unchangeable in human 
institutions?108 
Not all lawyers may subscribe to the general vision reflected in these 
passages. In fact, the mainstream approach in U.S. constitutional law endorses 
using categorical classifications as a means for deciding between conflicting 
rights or interests. Stated in general terms, a categorical approach seeks to hold 
that particular cases are governed by a particular category—say, a certain 
constitutional right—such that, by implication, competing categories 
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(competing rights or interests) do not apply. Free speech and public security are 
the standard examples. 
This debate is particularly prominent in constitutional law because 
constitutional rights are typically “big”—free speech, privacy, property—so 
that, together with their political origins, these rights have exceptional 
normative power. Yet, the debate about rights conflict is more fundamental. In 
the philosophical discourse on the nature of rights in general, two positions 
have emerged that resemble the constitutional discourse.109 Some argue that a 
right must have well-defined boundaries within which it is absolute—that is, no 
other right can contradict or overcome it. It thus follows that the proper 
response to an alleged conflict between rights is to better delineate their realms 
such that they will integrate rather than overlap.110 Others maintain, however, 
that such a definition of rights is unrealistic and that there can always be some 
overlap—and hence, conflict—between rights.111 
In the present context, we do not have to take a stand in this debate 
because, among other things, rights are a more rigid concept than values. Rights 
are based on values.112 What these separate discourses share, however, is the 
need to address the interrelations between conceptions of the desirable in 
different discussions about the desirable—in psychology, law, or philosophy. 
Research in psychology cannot refute, or even limit, the development of 
notional constructs in law or philosophy. Pure analytical theories are not bound 
by reality and do not need to be validated empirically. A theory of values that 
has been validated empirically nonetheless may contribute to assessing such 
notional constructs or suggest directions for further development. For example, 
the universal values identified at the individual level may help develop a 
universal theory of rights. The insight that individuals can analyze cognitive 
representations of the desirable and find different balancing points between 
them in different circumstances could help in assessing means for resolving 
 
 109. The following text draws on Jonathan Crowe, Explaining Natural Rights: Ontological Freedom 
and the Foundations of Political Discourse, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 70 (2009); Leif Wenar, Rights, 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Sept. 8, 2010), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
entries/rights/. 
 110. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); HILLEL STEINER, AN 
ESSAY ON RIGHTS (1994); GRÉGOIRE C. N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION: ON THE 
LIMITATION OF RIGHTS ch. 4 (2009); Russ Shafer-Landau, Specifying Absolute Rights, 37 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 209 (1995). Hence the term “specificationism” by Shafer-Landau and the adjective “compossible” 
for rights by Steiner. 
 111. See Joel Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, 
AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 221, 225 (1980); A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND 
POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 24–28 (1979); JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990). 
 112. See Alon Harel, Theories of Rights, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
AND LEGAL THEORY 191, 202–03 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005) (“It is only 
the full awareness of the meaningfulness of these practices [recognizing rights] which facilitate access to 
these values, and such an awareness is nourished by the judicial reiteration of the role the values have 
in justifying the right and dictating its scope.”). 
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This article has surveyed central developments in the theory of values in 
psychology and in economic research on rationality. An attempt was made to 
show that there exists substantial commonality among these disciplines in 
regard to conceptions of the desirable, which may facilitate the development of 
an expanded theory of rationality. Finally, this article has demonstrated how 
this analytical framework may be utilized to shed new light on basic legal issues. 
Needless to say, these are only first steps, which one hopes others will find 
worthy of consideration. 
 
